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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between firms’ heterogeneity and their 
multinational activity. We examine the scope and the scale of multinational firms 
following the insights of Yeaple’s (2009) model. The goal of the paper is to contribute 
to a better understanding of the activity of Spanish multinationals using a sample of 
Spanish multinational firms. Our dataset is built from two databases, SABI and ORBIS, 
both from the Bureau van Dijk. Our results confirm that more productive firms have a 
greater multinational activity in terms of both the scope (the number of foreign markets 
where they invest) and the scale (the volume of local sales by subsidiaries in foreign 
markets). The structure of Spanish multinational firms’ activity is also analysed from 
the perspective of host country characteristics (GDP, population, distance and language) 
using standard gravity equations. Country characteristics that are positively associated 
(GDP and common language) with the volume of multinational activity are negatively 
related to the productivity of firms that go abroad. This asymmetry also holds for 
bilateral characteristics as distance that appears negatively associated with the level of 
multinational activity.   
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1. Introduction 
Spanish firms have become important actors in the process of international foreign 
investment that has taken place in global markets in the last two decades. Guillén (2005) 
and García-Canal and Guillén (2010) refer to the “rise of Spanish multinationals” to 
characterise this process. The last World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2017) confirms 
this position of Spanish multinationals. Spain appears in the top 10 group of home 
countries with the highest outflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) at the world level. 
As Guillen (2005) indicates, among the group of countries with an average income level 
at the beginning of the second half of the last century, Spain has been, together with 
South Korea and Taiwan, one of the countries where the largest number of truly global 
multinationals have been established. An important feature of this process is that around 
90% of the FDI is destined for Europe and Latin America, and 80% is concentrated in 
infrastructure and financial services companies (García-Canal and Guillén, 2010). 
According to this evidence, the Spanish case is a significant episode of the recent 
expansion of multinational activity at the world level. Our analysis is a first attempt to 
examine a set of general characteristics concerning the multinational activity of Spanish 
firms.  
Our interest concentrates on three aspects of multinational firms (MNEs). First, we 
measure the strength of the relationship between the probability of investing in a foreign 
subsidiary in a given market and the productivity of their parent firms. We name it the 
elasticity of scope. A second objective is to measure the elasticity of scale, which relates 
the scale of the multinational activity in terms of the volume of sales of subsidiaries in a 
given market and their parent’s productivity. Both measures are important features for 
the characterisation of multinational firm activity, as suggested by Yeaple (2009) and 
Fariñas, Martín-Marcos and Velazquez (2018), among others. The third element of our 
research concerns the relationship between the aggregate level of multinational activity 
and host country characteristics. In particular, we estimate how country characteristics 
influence the aggregate level of Spanish foreign investment outflows, using the number 
and the volume of aggregate sales of foreign subsidiaries as a measure of these 
outflows. A further aspect, which complements the previous one, consists of estimating 
the relationship between country characteristics and the average productivity of parent 
firms that enter foreign markets. 
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To organise our empirical analysis, we rely on models of multinational activity and 
heterogeneous firms initiated by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). This literature 
combines two elements. The first one is the proximity-concentration model of Brainard 
(1997), where firms face a trade-off between exporting and foreign investment as two 
different ways to have access to foreign markets. The second element is Melitz’s (2003) 
model, where heterogeneous firms are identified by different levels of productivity that 
reflect differences in management ability, human capital, technology and the large set of 
resources that drive firm levels of productivity.  
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) show the existence of a sorting pattern between 
purely domestic firms, exporters and firms that go abroad through investment decisions. 
The latter group of firms dominates the other two in terms of their level of productivity. 
Yeaple (2009) extends this sorting to the scope and scale of multinational activity for 
the firms of a given country. We take both predictions as a reference to estimate the 
scale and scope elasticities of Spanish multinationals.  
An additional element we are interested in examining with empirical evidence for 
Spanish multinationals derives from an important feature of the models of Helpman, 
Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Yeaple (2009): country characteristics determine the 
productivity cutoff that drives the investment entry decision in foreign markets. One 
important consequence of this result is that the productivity composition of firms is 
determined by the characteristics of the countries where they invest. The size of the host 
market and the distance between the home and the host country of the investment 
decision, for example, are well-known factors that influence the amount of FDI 
positively or negatively (see Head and Mayer, 2014, for a review article, and Kleinard 
and Toubal, 2010, for an application). Therefore, we test whether country characteristics 
that are associated positively or negatively with the volume of FDI activity, in terms of 
both the number of firms and their volume of sales, are also related to the sign opposite 
to the productivity levels of parent firms that invest abroad.  
The objective of the paper is to test the previous set of predictions using a sample of 
Spanish multinational firms as a reference. With this aim, we build an original sample 
of firms based on the SABI and ORBIS databases of Bureau van Dijck. The sample 
links information about parent and subsidiary firms from both the manufacturing sector 
and the service sector. We examine both samples separately. The baseline sample for 
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manufacturing has 600 parent firms, which operate in 59 different host countries, and 
the service sample has 3,503 parent firms, which operate in 155 host countries. For the 
same results presented in this paper, we are able to identify 11,840 subsidiaries that are 
in both the manufacturing and service sectors and immediately owned by a Spanish 
parent firm. This number can be compared with the OECD figure for the total number 
of subsidiaries that are immediately owned by parent firms operating in Spain (Inward 
and Outward activity of subsidiaries by industrial sector; OECD.Stat for the year 2013): 
11,255 subsidiaries. Both numbers are quite similar. Therefore, we consider that our 
analysis almost fully reflects the characteristics and the properties of the population of 
Spanish multinationals. 
A further contribution of this paper concerns the empirical literature on models of 
heterogeneous multinational firms, in particular, the prediction concerning the selection 
of MNEs from the perspective of the scope and scale of their international activity. The 
relationship between the scale and scope of subsidiaries, on one hand, and the 
productivity of their parent firms, on the other, has already been examined empirically 
by a number of papers. The list includes the following: Aw and Lee (2008) for 
Taiwanese firms, Yeaple (2009) for US multinationals, Geishecker, Görg and Taglione 
(2009) for firms from 12 EU countries, Chen and Moore (2010) for French companies, 
Damijan, Kostevc and Rojec (2016) for nine new EU member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe, Nishiyama and Tamaguchi (2013) and Tanaka (2012, 2015) for 
Japanese firms, Shao and Shang (2016) for Chinese firms and Fariñas, Martín-Marcos 
and Velazquez (2018) for a multi-country examination of 30 European countries. Most 
of these papers refer to the manufacturing sector. Our paper contributes to this literature 
by offering empirical evidence for an additional country and particularly by using a 
sample of service firms that have been considered for analysis rather exceptionally.  
A last contribution concerns the asymmetry in the relationship between the attributes of 
the destination countries (distance, size of the country, etc.) that make FDI more or less 
attractive for MNEs and the characteristics of the productivity distributions of firms that 
enter foreign markets. Although this is a central prediction of the model of 
heterogeneous MNEs, empirical evidence on this hypothesis is very limited. To our 
knowledge, it has been considered by Yeaple (2009), Chen and Moore (2010) and 
Fariñas, Martín-Marcos and Velazquez (2018). The first paper examines a sample of US 
multinationals, the second is an application with French multinationals and the third is a 
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multi-country analysis for 30 European countries. Therefore, we add the evidence of an 
additional country to this short list of previously considered cases.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and the 
details of the main hypothesis to be analysed in section 4. Section 3 presents the 
characteristics of the dataset used in the paper along with the measurement issues and 
the definition of the variables. Section 4 reports the results: first, the results concerning 
the estimates of scope elasticities; second, the estimates of the relationship between the 
scale of subsidiaries and the productivity of their parent firms; third, the results related 
to the asymmetric effect hypothesis between the scale of multinational firms and their 
productivity based on the estimation of gravity equations. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypothesis 
This section presents the theoretical framework and the main hypothesis used to 
organise our empirical work. There are many approaches to and theories about 
multinational enterprise. To contextualise the one used here, we briefly summarise the 
main elements of this literature. 
A large group of theories focuses on the analysis of the international business strategy 
conducted by firms. In fact, most of them are theories of managerial choice (Kano and 
Verbeke, 2017). Stephen Hymer launched the first core theoretical perspective of the 
MNE and it was based on the concept of ownership advantage (Forsgren, 2003). 
Multinational firms have some advantages (new technology, managerial resources, 
internal economies of scale, etc.) to balance out the disadvantages (distance, cultural 
differences, higher risk, etc.) of entering foreign markets. 
The second core perspective is classical internalisation theory, formalised in terms of 
both the concept of transaction cost proposed by Ronald Coase and Hymer’s theory. 
Buckely and Casson (1976) was the first study to formulate these elements into a theory 
of MNEs. Internalise means, in this context, that the multinational firm performs a 
transaction within the firm as opposed to an external market (Kano and Verbeke, 2017). 
For MNEs, the decision to internalise was assumed to depend on both firm-specific and 
country-specific factors. A large body of empirical work on the determinants of Foreign 
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Direct Investment (FDI) originates in this theory. Since its origins, the internalisation 
approach has been reformulated in various different ways. One of the most popular is 
the eclectic paradigm of FDI proposed by Dunning (1979). A specific contribution of 
this theory is that it links the reasons for firms to enter a foreign market and the mode of 
entry (exports, FDI and licensing). It considers that a firm needs to have three 
advantages to open a subsidiary in a foreign market: organisation, location and 
internalisation (OLI paradigm). This OLI framework relates the determinants of FDI to 
firm-, industry- and country-specific factors.        
Forsgren (2013) proposes three additional perspectives of MNEs within the area of 
international business strategy: the organisational capabilities literature rooted in the 
resourced-based view of the firm; the business network theory popularised by the 
Uppsala model, which considers internationalisation to be driven by the market 
knowledge of the firm; and, finally, the institutionalisation theory. Kano and Verbeke 
(2017) review the microfoundations of all these approaches (see Dabic, Gonzalez-
Loureiro and Furrer (2014) for a more comprehensive review of the field of MNEs’ 
strategy).  
New trade theory (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) offers an alternative framework for 
the analysis of MNEs, building on industrial organisation models and the tradition of 
trade theory. As suggested by Faeth (2008), it incorporates ideas of the OLI eclectic 
paradigm with knowledge capital as the ownership advantage of an MNE and considers 
country size a potential location advantage for the firm. Next, we summarise the main 
ingredients of this approach.      
The distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI is at the core of this literature 
(Helpman, 2011). Horizontal FDI refers to foreign production roughly similar to those 
products produced by the parent firms at home. Vertical FDI, on the contrary, refers to 
the fragmentation of the production process between the part that is made at home and 
the part made abroad. The proximity-concentration trade-off plays a key role in 
explaining horizontal investment: by investing abroad, the firm saves transport costs, 
and by exporting (the alternative to not investing abroad), the firm saves fixed costs. 
Brainard (1993, 1997) uses this insight to explain horizontal FDI. Helpman (1984) 
proposes a different approach to explain vertical FDI. He develops a framework of 
monopolistic competition with product differentiation where MNEs exist because of 
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differences in factor endowments between countries. These differences translate into 
factor price differences across countries and vertically integrated firms exploit them 
with geographically fragmented production. Markusen (1984, 2002) complements these 
models by integrating both the horizontal and the vertical stream of the literature in the 
so-called knowledge-capital model of FDI. Therefore, in this literature, horizontal FDI 
is associated with the proximity-concentration approach while vertical FDI is linked to 
differences in factor prices across countries.     
Revisions of empirical studies that focus on the analysis of determinants of FDI suggest 
that models of horizontal and vertical FDI are relatively robust in their predictions. In 
particular, Faeth (2008) summarises the empirical literature by concluding that “market 
size, transport cost and trade barriers increased FDI, while factor endowments were only 
relevant in some cases”. These results indirectly confirm the idea that MNEs have some 
kind of ownership advantages as they have to overcome obstacles related to trade 
barriers, transport costs, etc. that non-MNEs do not have to confront. 
Previous approaches use analytical frameworks in which there is no firm heterogeneity 
within industries. A consequence of this, as Helpman (2011) writes, is that “all firms 
make the same choices, either all choose to export or either all choose to serve a foreign 
market with subsidiary sales”. This is a limitation of conventional models as they 
contradict empirical evidence. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) were among the first 
to introduce firm heterogeneity in previous theories. Models of multinationals with firm 
heterogeneity have become popular in recent years. Given that this approach integrates 
many features that come from previous theories, we would take into consideration the 
set of factors and the main hypothesis that come out of these models of heterogeneous 
MNEs. We would take these hypotheses as a reference to examine the multinational 
activity of Spanish firms. The literature we rely on starts with Helpman, Melitz and 
Yeaple (2004). This combines two approaches to the analysis of multinational activity: 
first, the proximity-concentration model of Brainard (1993, 1997), where firms face a 
trade-off between transport costs when they trade, and fixed investment costs when they 
decide to invest abroad; and second, the heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003), where 
firms differ in their productivity levels.    
Our examination of Spanish multinationals concentrates on two sets of predictions. The 
first refers to the factors that influence the scope and the scale of their activity. A 
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country-specific cutoff productivity level determines, according to these models, both 
the number of foreign affiliates a firm opens in foreign markets (scope) and the size of 
the operations of these affiliates (scale). The second set of predictions refers to the host 
country characteristics that influence the productivity cutoff and therefore the decisions 
that characterise the structure of multinational activity that we observe across 
destination countries. 
With respect to the first set of predictions, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) have 
shown the existence of a sorting pattern between exporting firms and firms that engage 
in FDI, the latter being the most productive group relative to both exporters and firms 
that serve only the domestic market. Yeaple (2009) shows that this kind of sorting also 
extends to the scope and scale of multinationals from a given country: more productive 
parent firms operate in a higher number of foreign markets and at a higher scale in terms 
of the average sales of their subsidiaries.  
In this paper we test for the existence of this sorting, taking a large sample of Spanish 
multinationals as a reference. The analysis considers two perspectives. The first 
concerns the scope of multinational activity. The second concentrates on the scale of the 
multinational activity. In particular, we examine the relationship between the size of 
subsidiary firms, measured in terms of sales in foreign markets, and their parent firms’ 
productivity. The second set of predictions concerns the relationship between 
multinational activity and host country characteristics. It is common in the literature of 
gravity equations to estimate the effect of country characteristics on aggregate flows of 
FDI activity by using either bilateral flows of FDI or aggregate sales as well as the 
number of affiliate firms that operate in foreign markets as dependent variables (see, for 
example, Brainard, 1997; Kleinert and Toubal, 2010). An important feature of Yeaple’s 
(2009) model is to consider that host country characteristics are an important 
determinant of the productivity cutoff that drives the investment entry decision of firms 
in foreign markets. Therefore, the productivity composition of firms with multinational 
activity is influenced by the characteristics of countries where they invest. This is the 
second prediction we examine. More specifically, we test whether country 
characteristics that are associated positively or negatively with the volume of 
multinational activity are related to the productivity levels of parent firms that invest 
abroad with the opposite sign. In short, country characteristics that encourage a greater 
volume of multinational activity induce the entry of successively less productive firms. 
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If this happens, country characteristics that positively affect the volume of multinational 
activity, defined in terms of the value of affiliates’ production in foreign markets across 
two countries, should be negatively associated with the level of productivity of the least 
productive parent firm that enters the host country. 
We summarise these predictions in terms of the following four hypotheses:  
H1: the number (scope) of subsidiaries in a given foreign market is larger the higher the 
productivity of their parent firms is.  
H2: the volume of the subsidiary’s sales (scale) in a given foreign market is positively 
affected by the productivity of its parent firms. 
To test H1, we estimate the relationship between the probability of investing in a 
foreign market and parent firms’ productivity. We called this the scope elasticity with 
respect to firm productivity. With respect to H2, we estimate the relationship between 
the subsidiary’s sales in foreign markets and parent firms’ productivity. We called this 
the scale elasticity of multinational activity. In both cases, the estimations control for 
both industry and host country effects.   
H3: the scale of operations of subsidiaries increases (decreases) the more (less) 
attractive the characteristics of the host country are. 
H4: country characteristics that positively (negatively) affect the scale of operations of 
subsidiaries should be negatively (positively) associated with the average productivity 
of parent firms that enter abroad.  
To test H3 and H4, we estimate gravity equations that include standard variables like 
host country GDP, a proxy of market size, distance, contiguity and other institutional 
variables that capture host and bilateral home-host country characteristics.  
Before proceeding with sections 3 and 4, devoted respectively to the dataset used in the 
estimation and the main results obtained, we briefly summarise the empirical literature 
on FDI in Spain.    
The largest part of the literature on FDI in Spain refers to FDI inflows. A big number of 
papers concentrates on the determinants of FDI at the aggregate, sectoral and regional 
levels: Myro and Martínez Serrano (1992), Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994), 
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Rodríguez and Pallás (2008), Bajo-Rubio, Diaz-Mora and Diaz Roldan (2010) and 
Villaverde and Maza (2012), among others. In general terms, they confirm that a large 
part of foreign capital inflows has relied, to a large extent, on previously resident 
Spanish companies through the acquisition of shares from these firms. With respect to 
the determinants of theses flows, the level of domestic GDP, as a proxy of the size of 
the local market, the level of trade barriers and a favorable level of relative labour costs 
are the main factors.  
FDI by multinational firms channels not only investment but also the inflow of new 
foreign knowledge and technology. This element of FDI may lead to spillovers to the 
local economy that are as important as the investment itself (Görg, 2016). This relevant 
question of research has been analysed in Spain by Alvarez and Molero (2005), who 
concluded that FDI induces positive effects on Spanish domestic firms operating in low-
content technological industries. In addition, Sanchez-Sellero, Rosell-Martínez and 
García-Vazquez (2014) examine the factors that influence the absorptive capacity of 
Spanish manufacturing firms.   
The interest in the empirical evidence on Spanish FDI outflows is more recent. Guillen 
(2005) has analysed what he calls the rise of the new Spanish multinationals. Spain, a 
country that at the beginning of the 1990s lacked companies of international size, has 
been able to generate a large number of truly global multinationals. Recent analysis that 
illustrates this interest in outflow FDI investment by Spanish multinationals includes 
Delgado, Ramírez and Espitia (2004), Gordo, Martín and Tello (2008a, 2008b), García-
Canal and Guillen (2010) and Myro (2014).     
Other issues that are more specific and also have attracted the attention of research: the 
choice of entry mode, Lopez-Duarte and García-Canal (2002), the relationship between 
foreign activities and productivity, Merino (2004) and Fariñas and Martín-Marcos 
(2007) and the strategic typology of firms as determinants of FDI investment, 
Almodovar, Navas López and Huerta Riveros (2009), among others.   
 
 
3. Data  
This section describes the characteristics of the dataset that has been used to test the 
predictions of heterogeneous models of FDI with information on Spanish 
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multinationals. The data used is based on firm-level information from SABI and 
ORBIS. Both datasets come from Bureau van Dijk, which provides company 
information based on company financial accounts and ownership structure. The SABI 
database contains information on Spanish firms and ORBIS provides business records 
on almost 200 million companies around the world. The ownership information for each 
firm refers to both the distribution of shareholders and the composition of their affiliated 
companies.  
From SABI we construct a sample of parent firms with a productive activity in Spain. 
These firms are immediate owners of at least one affiliate firm in a foreign market. 
From ORBIS we complete information on affiliated firms that were identified as 
participated by a Spanish firm in SABI. We link both parent and subsidiary firms using 
the identification number (id) provided by Bureau van Dijk for each firm in both 
datasets.  
To determine whether an investment can be considered FDI from a given country, the 
OECD (2005) recommends classifying the enterprise on the basis of the presence or 
absence of effective foreign participation in its capital. If a majority of ordinary shares 
(more than 50 percent of the capital) is held by a single foreign investor, then we refer 
to this as FDI. Following this consideration, we define links between a parent firm and 
its foreign affiliates in terms of the notion of “immediate property”. According to this 
criterion, a parent-multinational company is a firm that is the direct or immediate owner 
of at least one affiliate in a foreign country. Similarly, an affiliate firm is defined as an 
enterprise in which a non-resident investor owns more than 50 percent of the capital. 
The notion of “ultimate control” (OECD, 2005) is an alternative to the previous 
criterion. In this case, the affiliate company is under the ultimate control of a parent 
firm. The condition for defining the link between the affiliate company and its ultimate 
owner is that the parent firm owns more than 50% of the capital of the subsidiary at 
every step in the path of consecutive capital participations between the parent and the 
affiliate firm.  
The first approach (immediate property) identifies parent companies that are immediate 
owners of affiliate firms. With this criterion, there is no guarantee that ultimate control 
is based on a Spanish firm. The second criterion ensures that the subsidiaries are 
controlled by a Spanish parent firm. This distinction is relevant in the case of Spain, 
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given that a certain proportion of firms are controlled by foreign capital. Our analysis 
uses both criteria.  
An additional criterion that has been used to identify the link between the parent and the 
affiliate firm refers to the main activity performed by both firms. The sample of firms 
only includes parents and subsidiaries that have the same main activity. For parent firms 
that operate in the manufacturing sector, we only consider subsidiaries that have a 
manufacturing as their main activity. We apply a similar criterion for a parent and their 
affiliates that operate in the service sector.  
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of the sample of parents firms and countries used 
in the analysis. It reports information from the sample based on the criteria of both 
immediate owner and ultimate owner. Considering first the criterion of immediate 
property (sample 1a), SABI identifies a total number of 600 parent multinational 
manufacturing firms that have at least one subsidiary manufacturing firm. These 
subsidiaries operate in 59 different host countries.  With respect to parent multinationals 
of the service sector that are immediate owners of subsidiaries in the service sector, 
SABI provides a total number of 3,503 firms operating in 153 host countries. 
Manufacturing and service activities combined total 4,103 firms.  
SABI identifies links between firms, but in some cases, there is no complete financial 
information for the firms themselves. The last two rows of Table 1 (sample 1b) report 
the number of firms in the sample conditional on the fact that the value of TFP for the 
parent firm can be estimated with the information available. The total number of parent 
multinationals for both manufacturing and services is 3,283, approximately 80% of the 
observations with respect to the baseline sample. 
The second column of Table 1 reports the sample of parent firms considering the 
criterion of ultimate owner. The total number of parent multinational manufacturing 
firms that have at least one subsidiary manufacturer is 385. In the service sector, the 
number of parent firms that are ultimate owners of subsidiaries in the service sector 
diminishes to 2,605 firms. Manufacturing and service activities combined total 2,990 
firms. With respect to the baseline sample, there is a reduction of 27% in the number of 
firms. This reduction reflects the fact that a significant part of the sample of parent firms 
that produce in Spain, immediate owners of a subsidiary abroad, are also global ultimate 
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owners of their subsidiaries. We are interested in controlling for the differential effect 
that comes from this consideration.   
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the number of subsidiaries that correspond to the 
baseline sample. Almost 50% of multinational firms that operate in the service sector 
and almost 70% in the manufacturing sector have one subsidiary firm. About 20% of 
parent firms have two subsidiaries.  
To test hypothesis H2, we combine the information from the SABI and ORBIS 
databases. In particular, subsidiaries’ sales are obtained from ORBIS. Sample 2 in Table 
2 summarises the characteristics of this combined sample used in the analysis. To take 
into account the fact that some parent firms have more than one subsidiary and 
following Yeaple (2009), we define two samples. The first one, called a non-aggregated 
sample, considers each subsidiary located in the same country as the same parent firm a 
different observation. The second one, an aggregated sample, combines the sales of 
subsidiaries operating in the same country as the same parent and generates a single 
observation. Unfortunately, a large number of subsidiary firms listed in SABI are not 
available in ORBIS, which reduces the sample considerably.    
To deal with this problem, we also test hypothesis H2 using operation revenue turnover 
as a proxy for the sales of subsidiaries. In this case, it is not necessary to combine the 
SABI and ORBIS databases, because SABI gives information about this variable. 
Sample 3 in Table 2 provides information about this complementary sample. The total 
number of subsidiary firms for both manufacturing and services in 2013 is 11,840.  
Although SABI is a collection of business records rather than a comprehensive business 
register, it is suited for the analysis of multinational activity since it provides business 
information on a number of key variables and has good coverage for the set of Spanish 
parent firms with subsidiaries abroad. An effective way to assess the representativeness 
of the SABI dataset for our purpose is to compare the number of companies available in 
this dataset with the number of companies recorded by other sources. In our case, a 
good reference is provided by the OECD (inward and outward activity of multinationals 
by industrial sector, OECD.Stat), which, for the year 2013, cites 11,255 subsidiaries that 
are immediately owned by parent firms that operate in Spain. This number is quite close 
to 11,840, the number of subsidiaries recorded by SABI in the same year. We interpret 
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this as evidence that our sample of parent/subsidiaries is close to the population of 
reference.   
Concerning the variables used in the analysis, a first set of results refers to the scope and 
scale of multinational firms (hypotheses H1 and H2). The basic sources of this analysis 
are SABI and ORBIS, and the set of variables includes employment, sales or operating 
revenue turnover, and added value and tangible assets to estimate the TFP (see Table 3 
for definitions).   
To test hypotheses H3 and H4, we estimate gravity equations that include host country 
GDP, (GDP per capita), distance, and common language, among other country 
characteristics, as explanatory variables (see Table 3 for definitions). The basic source is 
the World Bank database.  
 
4. Results 
This section presents three sets of results. The first refers to the estimation of the scope 
elasticity of multinational activity. Scope elasticity is a measure that summarises the 
expected positive relationship between the probability of observing a subsidiary in a 
given foreign market and the productivity of its parent firm. The second refers to scale 
elasticity, which measures the intensity of the positive relationship between the 
affiliate’s local sales in foreign markets and the level of productivity of its parent firm. 
In sections 4.1 and 4.2, we offer various measures of the intensity of both relationships. 
The third set of results, presented in section 4.3, concerns the relationship between 
country characteristics and the structure of multinational activity. This analysis would 
be based on the estimation of gravity equations.   
 
4.1. Scope of Spanish multinationals and their productivity  
First, we provide estimations of parent multinational firms’ propensity to invest abroad 
as a function of their productivity. The specification is:  
1 2fj fj fj j j s s fj
j s
SUB lnTFP ln DSUO Country Industry                   [1] 
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where SUBfj is a variable equal to one if a Spanish parent firm f is the immediate owner 
of one or more subsidiaries in country j and zero otherwise. lnTFPfj	is the natural 
logarithm of TFP of parent firm f. DSUOfj is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
ultimate owner of the subsidiary is a Spanish parent firm (all ultimate owners are also 
immediate owners; therefore, this group of firms is a subsample of SUBfj) and zero 
when the ultimate owner is from the rest of the world. Countryj is a set of host country 
fixed effects and Industrys is a set of industry effects captured by industry dummies 
defined at the four-digit level of the NACE (rev 2) classification.  
We start estimating the linear probability model (LPM) for ease of comparison to 
previous literature that has used the same estimation approach (see, for example, 
Yeaple, 2009). The upper part of Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of 
equation (1) by OLS. As expected, for the manufacturing sector, the coefficient 
associated with the level of parent firms’ TFP is positive and significant, indicating that 
more productive firms are more likely to own a manufacturing affiliate in a given 
foreign market. The magnitude of the coefficient, 0.005, indicates that a 1% increase in 
the level of TFP increases the probability of opening a subsidiary by 0.00005. To put 
this magnitude in context, given that a Spanish manufacturing parent firm’s average 
probability of owning a subsidiary in a given market is 2.47% (see Figure 2), an 
increase of 10% in the level of TFP increases the probability by 2% (0.0005/0.0247). 
The coefficient is slightly lower than the coefficient provided by Yeaple (2009) for US 
manufacturing multinationals, 0.01. However, in a recent analysis of manufacturing 
multinational firms from 30 European countries, the impact of an increase of TFP on the 
probability of opening a subsidiary in a given market is similar to the impact reported 
here for Spanish manufacturing multinationals (see Fariñas, Martín-Marcos and 
Velazquez, 2018).  
The coefficient obtained for multinational firms that operate in the service sector, 0.006, 
is higher than the coefficient obtained for manufacturing. Given that the average 
probability that a Spanish parent firm operating in the service sector owns a subsidiary 
in a given market is 1.47%, an increase of 10% in the level of TFP increases the 
probability by 4% (0.0006/0.0147).  
In standard models of firm heterogeneity and international investment, size is a 
sufficient indicator of productivity (Melitz, 2003). For this reason, we also consider the 
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relationship between firm size (sales) and the probability of investing abroad. Table 4 
reports the coefficients, similar for both manufacturing and services, and equal to 0.004. 
Evaluated at the mean probability, this coefficient implies that doubling the size of the 
firm increases the probability by 16% and 27% for firms operating in manufacturing 
and service sectors, respectively. 
The variable DSUOfj, a dummy that indicates that the ultimate owner of the subsidiary 
is a Spanish parent firm, is also included in the estimation. For firms that operate in the 
services industry, the coefficient is positive and significant. These results indicate that 
the probability of opening a subsidiary in the service sector is between 0.003 and 0.005 
percentage points bigger if the ultimate owner is Spanish. However, the nationality of 
the ultimate owner does not affect the probability for firms that operate in the 
manufacturing sector.  
The lower panel of Table 4 reports probit estimations of equation [1]. Results are quite 
similar to those obtained from the linear probability model. Productivity positively 
affects the probability of a parent firm’s investing abroad. In general terms, the 
magnitude of the elasticity is slightly lower with the probit estimation. In the case of 
manufacturing, an increase of 10% of TFP increases the probability by 0.0003 points, 
which means a 1.2% increase in the average probability (0.0003/0.0247). In the case of 
services, the increase in the average probability is 0.68% for a 10% change in TFP 
(0.0001/0147). Finally, the impact of size on the probability is again lower with the 
probit estimation relative to the LPM, and the coefficients for either manufacturing or 
services are quite similar. 
Figure 2 reproduces histograms of the number of subsidiaries a parent firm has in a 
given market for both the manufacturing and the service sectors. The variable is 
concentrated in a small range of values, mainly 0, 1 and 2,  since most of the companies 
have a small number of foreign subsidiaries. In the case of manufacturing, 97.5% are 
zeros (no single subsidiary of the parent firm in country j), 2.3% correspond to firms 
with a subsidiary and 0.3% correspond to two subsidiaries. The rest of the observations 
correspond to a few additional integers. These numbers are quite similar for the service 
sector.  
Given that the number of subsidiaries is a discrete variable with non-negative integer 
values and it concentrates on a few small discrete values, a natural strategy for 
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complementing the previous analysis is to use count data models like Poisson. 
Therefore, using a similar specification to equation [1]:                 
1 2            fj fj fj j j s s fjj sNSUB exp lnTFP ln DSUO Country Industry    [2] 
where NSUBfj is the number of subsidiaries a parent firm f has in country j , and the rest 
of the variables are as in equation [1].   
We consider two issues associated with the estimation of equation [2] (see Fariñas, 
Martín-Marcos and Velazquez (2018) for a similar application to European 
multinational firms). The first one refers to the assumption the Poisson regression 
makes: the mean and the variance are the same. In many circumstances with count data, 
the variance exceeds the mean, a feature called over-dispersion. The consequence of 
over-dispersion is the underestimation of standard errors (Cameron and Trevidi, 2005). 
A strategy for addressing this problem is to modify the Poisson model, estimating a 
Negative Binomial regression. The second issue is termed the excess zeros problem, 
when there are more zeros in the data than the Poisson predicts. In this case, a modified 
model is called the zero-inflated model in the Poisson version (ZIP) and the zero-
inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB). These latter models complement a count density 
with a binary process. If the binary process takes the value 0, then our count variable is 
N = 0, and if the binary process takes the value 1, then variable N = 1, 2… (Cameron 
and Trevidi, 2005). Both models, ZIP and ZIBN, are estimated in two stages. In the first 
one, a binary logit model with the decision to open a subsidiary abroad or not is 
estimated. In the second stage, the discrete variable is examined, taking into account 
only the zeros that are the consequence of a do/not-to-do decision. This stage is 
modeled by a Poisson in the ZIP model and a Negative Binomial in the ZINB model. To 
interpret the coefficients of both the ZIP and the ZIBN, it is necessary to calculate the 
incidence ratios when the explanatory variable is dichotomous, as well as in the case 
of		ܦܷܵ ௙ܱ௝. Coefficients are interpreted directly as elasticities when the variable is 
continuous in logarithms, as is the case for TFP and sales. 
To determine which model best fits the distribution of our data, two tests, the LR 
(likelihood ratio test) of ߙ ൌ 0 (α being a parameter incorporated into the Negative 
Binomial) and the Vuong test, are carried out. The first one compares the Poisson 
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against the Negative Binomial model and the second test compares the "zero-inflated" 
against the simple regression models (Poisson or Negative Binomial). 
Table 5 reports various estimations for the manufacturing sector. Statistical tests 
comparing zero-inflated versions against the normal ones point to the zero-inflated 
versions as the preferred ones (see Vuong tests). For this reason, Table 5 only reports 
results for ZIP and ZINB estimators. Concerning the hypothesis of no over-dispersion, 
LR tests do not reject the null hypothesis and the ZIP is preferred in both equations 
(TFP and sales).  
Concerning the first stage, the variables used to predict the zeros of the second stage are 
the number of foreign subsidiaries owned by the parent company, the GDP of the host 
country, the distance to the host country and the number of employees of the parent 
company. We expect the number of foreign subsidiaries, the GDP of the host country 
and the level of employment of the parent firms to have a negative effect on the 
probability of not observing a subsidiary in a given foreign market. With respect to the 
distance to the host country, we expect that it positively affects the probability of 
observing a zero.  
The results of the first stage for firms that operate in the manufacturing sector are 
reported in the lower panel of Table 5. As can be seen, the total number of foreign 
subsidiaries and the distance to the host country are significant determinants of the 
decision to open a manufacturing subsidiary in a given foreign country. The negative 
coefficient of the number of subsidiaries indicates that the probability that the company 
does not consider opening a company in any given country decreases as the total 
number of subsidiaries increases. On the contrary, the greater the distance to the 
country, the greater the probability that the parent firm does not consider opening a 
subsidiary in that country. Both coefficients have the expected sign. The GDP of the 
host country and the number of employees have no significant effect. 
With respect to the second stage, the first and the second columns of the upper part of 
Table 5 present the estimations of the ZIP model, which, as we explained before, is the 
preferred one according to LR tests. The estimated elasticity between parent firm TFP 
and the number of subsidiaries that enter a given foreign market is positive but not 
statistically significant. However, when sales are considered as a measure of 
productivity (the second column), the coefficient is positive and significant. A 10% 
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increase in the size of the parent firm increases the number of subsidiaries abroad by 
almost 1%.  
Table 6 present the results for multinationals of the service sector. As in the case of 
manufacturing, statistical tests comparing zero-inflated versions against the normal ones 
point to the zero-inflated versions as the preferred ones (see Vuong tests).  Concerning 
the hypothesis of no over-dispersion, the LR test rejects the null hypothesis and the 
ZINB is preferred in both equations (TFP and sales). Therefore, columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 6 are the relevant ones.  
As expected, the estimations of the first stage (lower panel of Table 6) suggest that the 
number of subsidiaries of the parent firm and the GDP of the host country have a 
negative and significant impact on the probability of observing zero subsidiaries abroad. 
The variable distance has the expected positive sign. Employment has no significant 
effect. The result that the GDP of the host country is relevant in the decision to invest 
abroad in the case of services may be reflecting the fact that, in these activities, 
horizontal rather than vertical FDI motives are more relevant. The main objective of 
opening a subsidiary abroad is, in the case of services, related to the size and the sales in 
that market rather that the reduction of production costs. 
Concerning the second stage, both TFP and sales of the parent firm have a positive and 
significant effect on the number of subsidiaries abroad. Specifically, the estimated 
elasticity implies that an increase of 10% in TFP increases the probability of entering an 
additional subsidiary in a given market by 2.4%. In the case of sales, the equivalent 
elasticity is 1.7%.     
Overall, the results presented suggest that, for Spanish multinational firms, the number 
(scope) of their foreign affiliate firms is positively influenced by the size and the 
productivity of their parent firms. This result is stronger for firms in the service sector 
than for manufacturing firms. In general terms, these results confirm those previously 
reported in the literature.  
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 4.2 Scale of Spanish multinationals and their productivity  
A second set of results that this section presents concerns the scale of multinational 
activity. In models of multinational activity and heterogeneity (see Yeaple, 2009), it is 
assumed that the most productive companies not only have subsidiaries in more 
countries, but that these subsidiaries are more productive and, for this reason,  they have 
a higher scale than the less productive ones. Our objective in this second part of the 
section is to examine the relationship between the scale of operations of multinationals, 
measured by the volume of sales of their subsidiaries in a given host country and the 
productivity of their parent firms (hypothesis H2). As in the case of the scope elasticity, 
we consider both TFP and sales as measures of productivity of parent multinationals. 
The specification used is:  
1       fj fj j j s s fj
j s
ln S ln TFP Country Industry                     [3] 
where ln Sfj is the log of subsidiary sales a parent firm f has in country j, and the rest of 
the variables are as in previous equations. 
As we have explained in Section 3, we combine the SABI and ORBIS databases 
because we need the information about subsidiary firms provided by ORBIS. In 
addittion, two samples are considered. The first one, a non-aggregated sample, 
considers each subsidiary located in the same country as the same parent firm to be a 
different observation. The second sample, an aggregated sample, adds the sales of 
subsidiaries from the same parent firm operating in the same country into a single 
observation.  
Table 7 offers the main results. First, we take the non-aggregated sample as a reference. 
The first row shows the result of regressing the logarithm of the foreign affiliates’ sales 
on the logarithm of the parent’s TFP. The regression includes controls of country and 
industry effects. The estimated elasticity for the manufacturing industry implies that an 
increase of 1% in productivity increases the size of the subsidiary, proxied by the 
volume of sales, by 0.8%. This elasticity is slightly lower when TFP is substituted by 
the volume of the parent’s sales. In this case the elasticity is 0.5. The results that we 
obtain with the aggregated sample (see the right panel of Table 7) are very similar. 
Concerning the service sector, the elasticity between TFP and the size of the subsidiary 
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is lower than for the manufacturing sector. For services, the elasticity is 0.3 and 0.2 
when the productivity of the parent firm is proxied by its TFP or sales, respectively. 
Estimated coefficients are similar when taking the aggregated sample as a reference.   
Our results are quite similar to those obtained by Yeaple (2009) for US manufacturing 
companies: he obtains an expected increase of 0.8% (0.5%) in sales of subsidiaries 
when TFP (sales) of the parent company increases by 1%. 
As we explained in section 3, the use of the ORBIS database limits the sample 
considerably. For this reason, and with the aim of expanding the sample as much as 
possible, we repeated the exercise of estimating scale elasticities using operating 
revuenues turnover of the subsidiaries instead of sales, and labour productivity of the 
parent firm instead of TFP as our basic variables of analysis. The number of 
observations in the new sample is from 9 to 13 times the original one, as can be 
observed by comparing the number of observations in Tables 7 and 8.  
Table 8 presents the main results. We include both estimates from the aggregated and 
the non-aggregated samples.  They are very similar in their results. The coefficients are 
statistically significant and confirm a positive relationship between the size of 
subsidiaries and their parent’s productivity. The magnitude of scale elasticities is 
slightly lower compared with elasticities measured in terms of TFP, although the size of 
the samples in both cases is very different and the results are not comparable.  
Overall, the results presented in this section suggest that the size (scale) of Spanish 
multinational firms’ affiliate firms is positively influenced by the size and the 
productivity of their parent firms. These results are similar to those previously reported 
in the literature. 
 
4.3 Country characteristics and the asymmetric hypothesis of multinational 
activity  
The third part of this section examines the relationship between country characteristics 
and the structure of multinational activity. In particular, it shows how characteristics of 
countries like GDP and GDP per capita (GDPpc) of the host country, distance between 
home and host countries and institutional factors like sharing a common language 
influence the activity of multinational companies. Models of multinational activity and 
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heterogeneity, in particular Yeaple’s (2009), predict that the more attractive the 
characteristics of the host country are from the perspective of the investment decision, 
the greater the scale of operations of subsidiaries entering the host country is and, 
simultaneously, the lower the average productivity of the parent firms that invest in the 
host country. Therefore, a country characteristic that positively affects the level of 
multinational activity should be negatively associated with the average productivity of 
parent firms that enter that country (hypotheses H3 and H4). This asymmetry in the sign 
of both effects also holds for those characteristics that negatively affect the level of 
multinational activity.     
To test the previous predictions, we estimate gravity equations. We use the following 
specification:  
    0 1 2 3 4          j j j j j jln X lnGDP lnGDPpc ln DIST COMLANG        [4]       
where Xj measures both the intensity of Spanish multinational activity in host country j 
and the average level of productivity of Spanish parent firms investing in host country j. 
With respect to the intensity of multinational activity, we use two alternative measures: 
1) variable Sj, which measures the aggregate sales of subsidiaries in country j owned by 
Spanish parent firms; and 2) the variable Nj, which is the aggregate number of firms that 
enter country j.  With respect to the level of productivity of parent firms, we also use 
two different measures: 1) the average level of TFP of parent firms that enter country j 
and 2) a threshold which is the productivity of the least productive firm that enters 
country j.  
The right-hand variables of equation [4] are standard variables in gravity equations. The 
variable GDPj denotes the host country j and GDPpcj is the level of per capita GDP of 
country j. The variable DISTj denotes the bilateral distance between Spain and host 
country j, and COMLANGj is a dummy for countries that share a common language with 
Spain. The literature explaining multinationals’ location choices has also considered this 
set of factors (see for example, Chen and Moore, 2010). The GDP of the host country is 
a measure of the market potential for the investment decision, and we expect it to be 
positively related to the intensity of the multinational activity. Per capita GDP of the 
host country is a proxy of the level of development and an important determinant of FDI 
activity. For multinational activity, assuming other factors are equal, per capita GDP 
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should be positively associated with horizontal FDI motivations (market size of the host 
country) and negatively associated with vertical FDI motivations, as the level of per 
capita GDP is positively associated with the level of relative factor costs in the host 
country. The net effect remains ambiguous. Distance is included to control for fixed 
costs of investment associated with FDI. Subsidiaries located in distant markets are 
likely to require larger monitoring costs and therefore higher fixed costs of investment. 
These costs negatively affect the intensity of MNCs’ investment decisions. On the other 
hand, longer distance implies higher transport costs, and this gives more room to FDI 
relative to exporting. The net effect of distance is ambiguous from a theoretical point of 
view, although from an empirical point of view, the evidence is strongly in favour of a 
negative association. The last variable we consider, the existence of a common 
language, can be associated with lower fixed costs of investment, and we expect it to be 
positively associated with multinational activity. 
The testing strategy is based on comparing the signs associated in gravity equations 
with country characteristics. The model predicts a direct relationship between scale 
measures of multinational activity and the variables that make a country more attractive 
(higher GDP, less bilateral distance and sharing a common language). At the same time, 
it predicts an inverse relationship between these variables and the productivity measures 
of parent firms that invest abroad. The "hierarchical order" hypothesis predicted by 
Yeaple (2009) implies that countries with more attractive characteristics attract 
successively less productive companies. In aggregate terms, this greater attraction will 
increase the number of companies that enter a given foreign market and, therefore, the 
average productivity of the incoming companies will decrease. Consequently, we expect 
that, in gravity equations, certain country characteristics will be associated with 
opposite signs for the scale of multinational operations and for the average productivity 
of parent companies that enter abroad. 
Table 9 presents the empirical results obtained from the estimation of equation [4]. The 
upper panel corresponds to estimates of the manufacturing industry. In the first two 
columns, the dependent variables correspond to the two measures of multinational 
scale: volume of a subsidiary’s sales and the number of firms that enter a country j 
aggregated by country of destination. Columns 3 and 4 correspond to the estimates 
when the dependent variables are the two measures of productivity (average and the 
threshold of the least productive firms) of Spanish parent firms that invest abroad.  
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The scale of multinational activity for manufacturing activities, as expected, is 
positively associated with the level of host country GDP, negatively associated with the 
bilateral distance between Spain and the host country, and is higher with countries that 
share a common language (in this case only when the scale of multinational activity is 
measured by the number of firms that enter country j). Per capita GDP is negatively 
associated with the number of firms in destination countries (not significant if the scale 
of operations is measured by the sales of subsidiaries in destination countries). None of 
these variables in the set of country characteristics have a significant relationship with 
the average level of productivity of parent firms that enter host countries. However, 
when we proxy the productivity distribution of firms that enter foreign markets by the 
level of the least productive firm, we are able to identify some significant relationships. 
In particular, Table 9 indicates that host country GDP and common language have a 
negative relationship with productivity. This pattern is in the opposite direction with 
respect to the sign between both country characteristics and the scale of multinational 
activity. Therefore, we confirm the asymmetry predicted by models of firm 
heterogeneity. Per capita GDP and bilateral distance also have opposite signs but they 
are not statistically significant in the productivity equation.  
Our results are similar to those found by Yeaple (2009). However, we also find some 
differences. For example, the estimated scale elasticity for Spanish multinationals is 
smaller when this scale is measured by the sales of subsidiaries. This elasticity is larger 
for Spanish multinationals when the scale is proxied by the number of firms that enter 
country j. The impact of the common language (Spanish) on the level of the least 
productive firm is almost double the impact of sharing English in the Yeaple sample.      
Table 9 reports on the lower panel results for the service sector. They more strongly 
confirm the prediction concerning the asymmetry in the pattern of signs that country 
characteristics appear to be related to the scale of multinational activity and to the level 
of productivity of parent firms. The size of the host country and sharing a common 
language positively affect the scale of multinational activity. Both variables have a 
negative association with the level of the least productive parent firm that goes abroad. 
The bilateral distance that has a negative impact on the scale is positively associated 
with the second measure of productivity. Finally, the relationship with the per capita 
GDP variable is not significant. All these results hold when the productivity of parent 
firms is measured by the level of the least productive firm that goes abroad.  
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Concerning the magnitude of coefficients, for firms operating in the service sector, an 
increase of 1% of the host country’s GDP implies that expected sales of the subsidiary 
increase by 1.1% and that the number of Spanish parent companies that invest abroad 
will increase by 0.8%. The estimated elasticities are smaller in the manufacturing sector. 
Bilateral distance has a negative effect on both variables: an increase of 1% in the 
distance implies a decrease of 1.8% (1.4%) in the sales (number) of subsidiaries in the 
service sector. Sharing a common language has a much greater impact on the service 
sector than on manufacturing. It influences not only the number of firms as in the 
manufacturing sector but also the sales of subsidiaries: the sales are on average 3.6% 
higher than subsidiaries’ in the rest of the world, and the number of firms that enter a 
country j is 2% higher. Regarding productivity, the results obtained are statistically 
significant when the productivity distribution of entering firms is the minimum level of 
productivity. In this case, an increase of 1% of a host country's GDP reduces the 
threshold by 1.6%, an increase of 1% in bilateral distance increases the threshold by 
2.7% and, finally, the fact that the host country is Spanish-speaking reduces the 
threshold by 3.5%. 
Overall, the pattern of signs we obtain with various country characteristics is consistent 
with the prediction of asymmetric effects between the scale and the distribution of 
productivity of parent firms that go abroad. We have to add two qualifications to this 
result. First, this consistency with predictions of models of FDI and heterogeneity is 
greater in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector. Second, the distribution of 
productivity of entering firms needs to be defined in terms of the threshold for the least 
productive firm to confirm the hypothesis of Yeaple’s (2009) model.  
For the purposes of robustness, we offer additional results to control for heterogeneity at 
the sectoral level. We estimate equation [4], taking the country-sector unit of 
observation as a reference. Sectors are defined at the two-digit level. Consequently, the 
new variables used in the estimation have dimension js, where j is the country of 
destination and s is the sector defined at the two-digit level. Apart from expanding the 
overall number of observations substantially, in this way we also control for differences 
across industries. 
Table 10 presents the results. They are quite similar to those included in Table 9. 
Overall, the consistency with the asymmetric hypothesis is stronger for services when 
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we disaggregate the sample of observations by country-sector. The pattern of signs we 
obtain confirms that country characteristics that positively (negatively) affect the 
volume of multinational activity induce the entry of successively less (more) productive 
firms.   
Finally, for the purposes of robustness, we have estimated the gravity equations 
reported in Tables 9 and 10 taking the SABI database exclusively as a reference. As in 
section 4.2, we take the operating revenue turnover of the subsidiaries as the measure of 
sales and labor productivity of the parent firm as the measure of productivity as a 
reference. These estimations complement results reported in Tables 9 and 10 and are 
included in the Appendix as Tables A1 and A2.   
We confirm previous results for the services sector. The pattern of signs is again 
consistent with the prediction of asymmetric effects for the relationship between 
country characteristics and the scale of subsidiaries, on one hand, and the relationship 
between country characteristics and the distribution of productivity of parent firms that 
go abroad, on the other hand. Additionally, with this sample, the predictions also apply 
to the manufacturing sector. 
 
5. Conclusions   
This paper examines the relationship between a firm’s heterogeneity and its 
multinational activity. The empirical analysis refers to Spanish multinational firms and 
it is based on two datasets: SABI and ORBIS. The sample links information from 
parent-subsidiary pairs of firms. The number of links in the sample is close to the 
number of firms provided by the OECD in its statistics on outward and inward activity 
of MNEs. Therefore, inferences in this paper are based on a sample that is 
representative of the population of Spanish multinational firms.   
Results in section 4.1 indicate that the number (scope) of foreign affiliates from Spanish 
MNEs is positively influenced by the size and productivity of their parent firms. The 
estimated scope elasticity using count models indicates that a 10% increase in TFP 
increases the probability of opening a new or an additional subsidiary in a given foreign 
market, with the main activity similar to the parent firm’s, by 2.4%. This scope 
elasticity applies to the service sector. For the manufacturing sector, the magnitude of 
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the scope elasticity is similar if we estimate it by the probit and the linear probability 
models.  Elasticity estimates obtained using count models are not statistically significant 
for the manufacturing sector.  
As we can identify the link between the parent and the affiliate firm in terms of who the 
ultimate owner is, we restrict the sample to subsidiaries that have a Spanish parent firm 
as the ultimate owner. A variable that captures this characteristic has a positive impact 
on the probability of operating in a given foreign market through a subsidiary with the 
same activity as the parent firm. This applies to Spanish multinationals in the service 
sector but not in the manufacturing sector.  
Section 4.2 reports estimates of the scale elasticity of Spanish multinationals. For the 
manufacturing sector, the estimated elasticity implies that an increase in TFP of the 
parent firm increases the size of the subsidiary, in terms of sales, by 0.8%. For the 
service sector, the elasticity is slightly lower, 0.3%. There is no previous evidence of 
this kind for the service sector. For the manufacturing sector, the scale elasticity for 
Spanish MNEs is identical to the estimate for US multinationals, 0.8%, reported by 
Yeaple (2009). 
A third set of results (section 4.3) refers to the relationship between country 
characteristics and the structure of multinational activity. The estimation of gravity 
equations permits us to test a basic prediction of models of multinational activity and 
heterogeneity (Yeaple, 2009): host country characteristics that positively (negatively) 
affect the level of multinational activity, in terms both of the number of subsidiaries and 
the value of their sales, should be negatively (positively) associated with the average 
level of productivity of parent firms that enter those markets. We confirm this 
asymmetry for the GDP of the host country. It has a positive influence on the level of 
multinational activity and is negatively associated with the level of productivity of 
parent firms that go abroad. For the bilateral distance between home-host countries, the 
effect is positive on the scale of multinational activity and negative for productivity. 
With respect to the existence of a common language between the host and the home 
country, results are similar to those obtained for the GDP of the host country. We name 
this result the “asymmetric effect hypothesis”. The pattern is confirmed only when the 
level of productivity of firms that enter foreign markets is measured by the productivity 
of the least productive parent firm. These results apply better, in terms of statistical 
significance, to the service sector than to the manufacturing sector.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Country characteristics, degree of multinational activity and productivity of parent 
multinational firms. Complementary sample (SABI).     
 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors to heterocedasticity in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 
5%**, 10%*. All regressions include host countries and 4-digit industry dummies.  
 
  
 
Manufacturing sector 
 
Aggregate sales of 
subsidiary firms in 
j (in logs.) 
Number of firms 
that enter j 
(in logs.) 
Average 
productivity of 
parent firms that 
enter j 
(in logs.) 
Productivity of the 
least productive 
parent firm that 
enters j (in logs.) 
ln GDPj  
0.927** 
(0.182) 
0.790*** 
(0.077) 
-0.121 
(0.233) 
-1.211** 
(0.260) 
ln GDPpcj 
-0.500* 
(0.296) 
-0.578*** 
(0.140) 
0.193 
(0.301) 
0.798* 
(0.621) 
ln DISTj	 -1.288*** (0.347) 
-1.106*** 
(0.204) 
-0.159 
(0.324) 
1.584** 
(0.621) 
COMLANGj 
0.753 
(0.639) 
1.468*** 
(0.374) 
1.130 
(0.705) 
-2.649** 
(1.183) 
R2 0.437 0.610 0.049 0.373 
N 46 61 57 57 
 Service sector 
 
Aggregate sales of 
subsidiary firms in 
j (in logs.) 
Number of firms 
that enter j 
(in logs.) 
Average 
productivity of 
parent firms that 
enter j 
(in logs.) 
Productivity of the 
least productive 
parent firm that 
enters j (in logs.) 
ln GDPj  
0.889*** 
(0.195) 
0.563*** 
(0.048) 
0.142*** 
(0.051)  
-0.722*** 
(0.132) 
ln GDPpcj 
0.883 
(0.237) 
0.163** 
(0.071) 
0.154* 
(0.084) 
-0.330 
(0.228) 
ln DISTj	 -1.365*** (0.350) 
-0.781*** 
(0.148) 
0.108* 
(0.057) 
0.259 
(0.523) 
COMLANGj 
3.505*** 
(0.659) 
2.353*** 
(0.284) 
0.379** 
(0.168) 
-2.553*** 
(0.780) 
R2 0.580 0.698 0.181 0.332 
N 70 148 133 144 
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Table A2  
Country characteristics, degree of multinational activity and productivity of parent 
multinational firms (unit of observation is country-sector).  
Complementary sample (SABI). 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors to heterocedasticity in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 
5%**, 10%*. All regressions include host countries and 4-digit industry dummies.  
 
  
     
 Manufacturing sector 
 
Aggregate sales  
of subsidiary firms 
in j (in logs.) 
Number of firms 
that enter j 
(in logs.) 
Average 
productivity of 
parent firms that 
enter j 
(in logs.) 
Productivity of the 
least productive 
parent firm that 
enters j (in logs.) 
ln GDPj  
0.178** 
(0.089) 
0.228*** 
(0.025) 
-0.085 
(0.106) 
-0.329*** 
(0.088) 
ln GDPpcj 
0.175 
(0.137) 
-0.182*** 
(0.038) 
-0.054 
(0.142) 
0.509*** 
(0.175) 
ln DISTj	 -0.263 (0.169) 
-0.394*** 
(0.054) 
-0.036 
(0.160) 
0.940*** 
(0.175) 
COMLANGj 
0.085 
(0.389) 
0.536*** 
(0.118) 
0.273 
(0.380) 
-1.240*** 
(0.394) 
R2 0.051 0.173 0.01 0.090 
N 248 370 347 355 
 Service sector 
 
Aggregate sales of 
subsidiary firms in j 
(in logs.) 
Number of firms 
that enter j 
(in logs.) 
Average 
productivity of 
parent firms that 
enter j 
(in logs.) 
Productivity of the 
least productive 
parent firm that 
enters j (in logs.) 
ln GDPj  
0.528*** 
(0.083) 
0.181*** 
(0.024) 
-0.002 
(0.038) 
-0.310*** 
(0.071) 
ln GDPpcj 
0.568*** 
(0.137) 
-0.056 
(0.044) 
0.229*** 
(0.065) 
0.085 
(0.123) 
ln DISTj	 -0.500*** (0.146) 
-0.347*** 
(0.059) 
0.063 
(0.067) 
0.863*** 
(0.161) 
COMLANGj 
1.693*** 
(0.363) 
0.559*** 
(0.119) 
0.317* 
(0.170) 
0.508 
(0.322) 
R2 0.168 0.085 0.021 0.067 
N 577 1076 868 975 
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Table 1 
Sample: number of parent firms 
 
Sample: Activity:  
Parent firms that are 
immediate owners of 
subsidiaries abroad  
Parent firms that are 
ultimate owners of 
subsidiaries abroad 
Number of 
host 
countries*  
 (1a)  Manufacturing  600 385 59 Services 3503 2605 155 
 (1b) Manufacturing 556 412 59 Services 2727 2031 143 
 
Notes:  
* corresponds to the sample of immediate owners 
(1a) initial sample 
(1b) sample requiring that the variable TFP be available.  
 
Table 2 
Sample: number of parents and subsidiary firms 
Sample: Activity:  
 
Subsidiary 
firms  
Parents - Subsidiary firms 
Non-
aggregated 
sample 
Aggregated 
sample 
(2) Manufacturing 177 178 171 Services 871 983 824 
(3) Manufacturing 1,553 1,598 1,080 Services 10,287 11,149 5,185 
 
Notes:  
(2) Combined sample (SABI / ORBIS) 
(3) Complementary sample (SABI)  
See text for the distinction between both samples. 
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Table 3: Variables definitions 
COMLANGj Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the host country j 
shares a common language with Spain.   
DISTj  
 
Bilateral distance between Spain and the host country j. It is 
calculated following the great circle formula, which uses the 
latitudes and longitudes of the most important 
cities/agglomerations.  
Employment Total number of employees of the parent and subsidiary firms. 
GDPj  Gross Domestic Product of the country j where the subsidiary 
firm is located.  
GDPpcj  Gross Domestic Product per capita of the host country j where 
the subsidiary firm is located.  
Labour productivity Operating revenue turnover per employee.  
Sales Two approaches are used: sales and operating revenues 
turnover.  
TFPi (Total Factor 
Productivity) 
݈݊ܶܨ ௜ܲ ൌ ݈݊ܳ௜ െ ߚመ௄݈݊ܭ௜ െ ߚመ௅݈݊ܮ௜, where, for firm i, ܳ௜ 
denotes added value, ܭ௜ is the book value of tangible assets 
and ܮ௜ is employment. The coefficients ߚመ௄ and ߚመ௅ are obtained 
from the estimation of the production function separately for 
each industry at the two-digit level, using the methodology 
developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
Sources: SABI, ORBIS, World Bank database and the web es.distance.to.  
 
  
36 
 
Table 4 
Scope of Spanish multinationals: Probability of entry in a foreign market  
                       
 Linear Probability Model  
 
Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services 
ln TFPfj 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.006***
(0.000)   
ln Salesfj     
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
DSUOfj  
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003***
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
     
R2 0.067 0.097 0.069 0.094 
N 32,804 389,961 35,400 542,965 
 
Probit 
 
Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services 
ln TFPfj 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000)   
ln Salesfj     
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
DSUOfj  
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001***
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
     
Log 
pseudolikelihood -3,147 -23,708 -3,354 -31,195 
N 32,804 389,961 35,400 542,965 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors to heterocedasticity in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 
5%**, 10%*. All regressions include host countries and 4-digit industry dummies. In the probit model, 
marginal effects are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to 
the change from 0 to 1. 
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Table 5 
The scope of Spanish multinationals: the number of subsidiary firms in the 
manufacturing sector  
 
2nd stage:  ZIP       ZIP ZINB      ZINB 
ln TFPfj 
0.075 0.075 
(0.053) (0.053) 
ln Salesfj  
0.095*** 0.097*** 
(0.031) (0.031) 
DSUOfj 
0.057 0.068 0.057 0.070 
(0.093) (0.089) (0.093) (0.089) 
1st stage: model predicting zeros:  
Total number of foreign 
subsidiaries 
-1.220*** -1.066*** -1.220*** -1.095*** 
(0.197) (0.18) (0.197) (0.197) 
Host GDP 0.155 0.096 0.155 0.099 (0.095) (0.094) (0.095) (0.096) 
DIST 0.447*** 0.489*** 0.447*** 0.492*** (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) (0.109) 
Employment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Log pseudolikelihood -3,317 -3,497 -3,317 -3,497 
LR Test   0.497 0.314 
Vuong Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 32,804 34,574 32,804 34,574 
 
Notes: ZIP and ZINB indicate Zero-Inflated Poisson and Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial, respectively. 
Robust standard errors to heterocedasticity in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 
10%*. All regressions include host countries and 4-digit industry dummies. In LR and Vuong tests, the p-
value is presented. 
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Table 6 
The scope of Spanish multinationals: the number of subsidiary firms in the service 
sector  
 
2nd stage:  ZIP         ZIP  ZINB       ZINB 
ln TFPfj 
0.217*** 0.238*** 
(0.009) (0.012) 
ln Salesfj  
0.152*** 0.173*** 
(0.005) (0.006) 
DSUOfj 
-0.002 0.089*** 0.054 0.154*** 
(0.029) (0.025) (0.034) (0.031) 
1st stage: model predicting zeros:  
Total number of foreign 
subsidiaries 
-0.224*** -0.201*** -0. 410*** -0.384*** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.016) (0.014) 
Host GDP -0.096*** -0.111*** -0.192*** -0.225*** (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) 
DIST 0.480*** 0.435*** 0.648*** 0.637*** (0.02) (0.019) (0.027) (0.025) 
Employment  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Log pseudolikelihood -29,322 -36,307 -27,695 -34,051 
LR Test   0.000 0.000 
Vuong Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 370,872 468,076 370,872 498,076 
 
Notes: ZIP and ZINB indicate Zero-Inflated Poisson and Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial, respectively. 
Robust standard errors to heterocedasticity in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 
10%*. All regressions include host countries and 4-digit industry dummies. In LR and Vuong tests, the p-
value is presented. 
 
 
 
 
  
39 
 
Table 7 
The scale of Spanish multinationals as a function of parent’s productivity 
Combined sample (SABI/ORBIS) 
 
 Non-aggregated  Sample Aggregated simple 
Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services 
ln TFPfj 
0.769** 
 
0.331***
 
0.794**
 
0.384*** 
 (0.354) (0.736) (0.369) (0.082) 
ln Salesfj   
0.537*** 
 
0.234***
 
0.566*** 
 
0.246***
(0.148) (0.037) (0.156) (0.039) 
         
R2 0.739 0.749 0.368 0.370 0.749 0.751 0.424 0.422 
N 172 178 801 983 165 171 665 824 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors to heterocedasticity in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 
5%**, 10%*. All regressions include host countries and 4-digit industry dummies. The number of 
observations of columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) is slightly smaller because TFP for the parent multinational is 
used.  
 
 
Table 8 
The scale of Spanish multinationals as a function of parent’s productivity 
Complementary sample (SABI) 
 
 Non-aggregated  Sample  Aggregated simple 
Manufacturing Services  Manufacturing Services 
Parent’s labour 
productivity 
(in log) 
0.362*** 
(0.049)  
0.226***
(0.014)  
 0.412***
(0.067)  
0.288***
(0.020)   
ln Salesfj   
0.277***  0.182***   0.307***  0.223***(0.031) (0.008)  (0.039) (0.011) 
          
R2 0.363 0.385 0.224 0.240  0.425 0.459 0.275 0.305 
N 1,573 1,598 10,480 11,149  1,060 1,080 4,832 5,185 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors to heterocedasticity in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 
5%**, 10%*. All regressions include host countries and 4-digit industry dummies. The number of 
observations of columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) is slightly smaller because the parent’s labor productivity is 
used.  
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Table 9 
Country characteristics, degree of multinational activity and productivity of parent 
multinational firms    
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors to heterocedasticity in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 1%***,  
5%**, 10%*. All regressions include host countries and 4-digit industry dummies.  
 
  
 
Manufacturing sector 
 
Aggregate sales 
of subsidiary 
firms in j (in 
logs.) 
Number of firms 
that enter j 
(in logs.) 
Average 
productivity of 
parent firms that 
enter j 
(in logs.) 
Productivity of the 
least productive 
parent firm that 
enters j (in logs.) 
ln GDPj 
0.524** 
(0.231) 
0.667*** 
(0.093) 
-0.147 
(0.344) 
-0.600** 
(0.303) 
ln GDPpcj 
-0.472 
(0.524) 
-0.435** 
(0.170) 
0.091 
(0.484) 
0.341 
(0.347) 
ln DISTj 
-1.828*** 
(0.506) 
-0.879*** 
(0.193) 
-0.235 
(0.508) 
0.616 
(0.612) 
COMLANGj 
-1.846 
(2.828) 
1.245** 
(0.503) 
1.192 
(0.508) 
-2.047** 
(1.022) 
R2 0.491 0.527 0.042 0.198 
N 23 40 38 39 
 Service sector 
 
Aggregate 
sales of 
subsidiary 
firms in j (in 
logs.) 
Number of firms 
that enter j 
(in logs.) 
Average 
productivity of 
parent firms that 
enter j 
(in logs.) 
Productivity of the 
least productive 
parent firm that 
enters j (in logs.) 
ln GDPj 
1.050*** 
(0.284) 
0.798*** 
(0.080) 
0.217 
(0.163) 
-1.585*** 
(0.274) 
ln GDPpcj 
-0.123 
(0.467) 
-0.130 
(0.131) 
-0.035 
(0.179) 
0.161 
(0.441) 
ln DISTj 
-1.781*** 
(0.412) 
-1.366*** 
(0.178) 
-0.252 
(0.155) 
2.676*** 
(0.432) 
COMLANGj 
3.608** 
(1.339) 
2.037*** 
(0.402) 
0.893** 
(0.390) 
-3.531*** 
(1.131) 
R2 0.559 0.643 0.111 0.494 
N 36 66 59 65 
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Table 10  
Country characteristics, degree of multinational activity and productivity of parent 
multinational firms (unit of observation is country-sector)  
 
Notes: Robust standard errors to heterocedasticity in parentheses. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 
5%**, 10%*. All regressions include host countries and 4-digit industry dummies.  
 
  
     
 Manufacturing sector 
 
Aggregate sales 
of subsidiary 
firms in j (in 
logs.) 
Number of firms 
that enter j 
(in logs.) 
Average 
productivity of 
parent firms that 
enter j 
(in logs.) 
Productivity of the 
least productive 
parent firm that 
enters j (in logs.) 
ln GDPj  
0.333** 
(0.120) 
0.124*** 
(0.030) 
-0.282* 
(0.159) 
-0.040 
(0.114) 
ln GDPpcj 
0.504* 
(0.292) 
-0.092** 
(0.047) 
0.105 
(0.243) 
0.127 
(0.173) 
ln DISTj	 -0.422 (0.306) 
-0.210*** 
(0.065) 
0.368 
(0.268) 
0.159 
(0.238) 
COMLANGj 
-0.475 
(1.393) 
0.377** 
(0.147) 
-0.412 
(0.539) 
-0.727 
(0.483) 
R2 0.182 0.072 0.027 0.013 
N 100 201 189 190 
 Service sector 
 
Aggregate sales 
of subsidiary 
firms in j (in 
logs.) 
Number of firms 
that enter j 
(in logs.) 
Average 
productivity of 
parent firms that 
enter j 
(in logs.) 
Productivity of the 
least productive 
parent firm that 
enters j (in logs.) 
ln GDPj  
0.542*** 
(0.142) 
0.158*** 
(0.032) 
-0.021 
(0.077) 
-0.679*** 
(0.121) 
ln GDPpcj 
-0.069 
(0.287) 
-0.061 
(0.054) 
0.178 
(0.128) 
0.431* 
(0.221) 
ln DISTj	 -0.406* (0.228) 
-0.278*** 
(0.064) 
0.044 
(0.114) 
0.936*** 
(0.188) 
COMLANGj 
1.731*** 
(0.643) 
0.330** 
(0.129) 
0.203 
(0.278) 
-1.051** 
(0.444) 
R2 0.113 0.066 0.006 0.088 
N 235 490 415 467 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of parent firms by the total number of subsidiaries they have    
 
Note: * Parent firms with 14 or more subsidiaries are jointly considered. 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of the number of subsidiary firms owned by a parent firm in a given 
market. 
Manufacturing 
 
97,53%
2,30% 0,13% 0,02% 0,01% 0,01%
0 1 2 3 4 5 or more
 
Services 
98,53%
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